Infrastructure has become the allocation the world’s professional buyers most want to own, and the evidence for that is unusually consistent across independent samples. In McKinsey’s survey of approximately 300 global limited partners, 51 percent intend to raise their infrastructure allocation over the next three years, placing it ahead of buyout at 35 percent and real estate at 30 percent. In the Marsh 2026 Global Asset Owner Barometer, fielded in June and July of this year across 430 asset owners managing 5.76 trillion dollars and including wealth managers, private banks and family offices alongside institutions, the same 51 percent said they would increase infrastructure over the next twelve months, while the share planning to add private debt fell to 34 percent from 48 percent a year earlier. Capital has followed the intention. Closed end infrastructure fundraising reached a record of close to 200 billion dollars in 2025, a rise of roughly 58 percent over the prior year and a surpassing of the previous 2022 peak, at a moment when fundraising across most other private asset classes was flat or contracting. Private infrastructure fund assets stood at just over 1.7 trillion dollars in September 2025, with projections that they could exceed 3 trillion by 2030.
The consensus is genuine. The difficulty is that the asset class arriving in portfolios is not the one the label still describes. Three things changed underneath the word infrastructure while the allocation debate was being settled. The risk profile moved: core fundraising declined by nearly 19 percent in the most recent year while core plus grew by roughly 390 percent and value added by about 30 percent, which means the marginal dollar is buying development and operational risk rather than regulated, contracted cash flow. The sector composition narrowed: energy and power accounted for nearly half of 2025 infrastructure deal value and digital and telecommunications for a further quarter, so that roughly three quarters of private capital is concentrated in the two verticals that represent about 40 percent of the global need, and a growing share of that power is being built to serve the same compute demand that drives the digital half. And the cash return fell: five year distributions to paid in capital have declined from a median near 40 percent during the exit cycle of the mid 2010s to approximately 13 percent, the lowest recorded level, while average holding periods lengthened from a range of 3.1 to 3.3 years in 2017 to 2022 to a range of 3.5 to 3.8 years in 2023 and 2024.
Those three shifts would be a technical matter for institutional allocation committees were it not for the fourth development, which is that the wealth channel is being offered this exposure now, in semi-liquid form, through evergreen vehicles and retail eligible fund regimes whose liquidity models rest on portfolio income and natural exits. This paper makes three arguments. First, that the diversification case for infrastructure, which rests on regulated and contracted cash flows behaving differently from corporate equity, has been substantially weakened by the composition of recent deployment, and that an adviser underwriting the old case is underwriting something the current market is not selling. Second, that the distribution shortfall described above is the single most important fact for any wealth manager considering a semi-liquid infrastructure vehicle, because the format’s liquidity depends on precisely the cash that is currently not arriving. Third, that for the offshore and Latin American corridor the problem inverts: the region has the largest unfunded infrastructure need in the hemisphere and the smallest share of the capital, and the client who buys a global infrastructure allocation is almost certainly buying North American and European power and compute rather than anything connected to the economy in which they live and earn. Section I establishes the consensus. Section II examines what the label stopped describing. Section III sets out the distribution problem. Section IV turns to the wrapper. Section V tests the diversification claim. Section VI addresses the corridor. Section VII converts the argument into questions.
The Consensus Trade
It is worth being precise about how strong the agreement now is, because the strength of an agreement is itself a risk factor. McKinsey’s limited partner survey places infrastructure first among all private asset classes by intended allocation increase, and notes that sovereign wealth funds, insurers and family offices show the highest intent, with a ten percentage point increase against the 2024 reading. The stated reasons have shifted in a way that deserves attention. Diversification remains the leading motivation at 68 percent, but expected return improvements are cited by 52 percent of limited partners, an eleven point jump over two years, and asset class performance by 48 percent. Two years ago infrastructure was primarily a ballast allocation. It is now, for more than half the market, a return seeking one.
The Marsh barometer corroborates the direction from a different sample and a different question. Private markets exposure among the 430 respondents is close to universal at 96 percent, up from 80 percent a year earlier, and infrastructure leads the list of intended increases at 51 percent, ahead of emerging market equities at 47 percent and inflation linked assets at 41 percent. The most striking movement in that survey is in cash, where 38 percent plan to increase against 9 percent the previous year, which the authors read as a barbell: downside protection and liquidity on one side, long duration real assets on the other. Selectivity is rising alongside conviction, with 44 percent reporting that they are maintaining pace but with greater discrimination, and valuation cited by 47 percent as the most significant factor shaping deployment.
The fundraising record confirms that these are not merely stated preferences. Closed end infrastructure fundraising climbed from 95 billion dollars in 2023 to 126 billion in 2024 and then to nearly 200 billion in 2025, a compound annual growth rate of about 9 percent since 2020 at a time when most other private asset classes were declining at 3 to 5 percent a year. Infrastructure overtook real estate in annual fundraising for the first time in 2024 and has not given the position back. Two definitional notes matter for anyone comparing figures across reports. Preqin’s broader measure, which captures open ended and debt vehicles that the closed end series excludes, puts 2025 infrastructure fundraising closer to 300 billion dollars, and the same source records just over 1.7 trillion dollars of private infrastructure assets under management as of September 2025, including roughly 400 billion dollars of uninvested capital. The gap between the two headline numbers is a measure of how much of the asset class now sits outside the traditional closed end fund, which is itself part of this paper’s subject.
Concentration is the final feature of the consensus. The top ten managers account for 44 percent of total commitments, fundraising in 2025 was more heavily weighted toward funds above 10 billion dollars than in any prior year, and average deal size rose 78 percent year on year even as deal count fell by about 24 percent. A wealth business selecting an infrastructure manager in 2026 is therefore choosing from a shorter effective shelf than the fund count suggests, and the largest vehicles on that shelf are buying larger, more complex assets than the vehicles that produced the track records being shown.
What the Label Stopped Describing
The word infrastructure carries an implicit set of promises that were formed when the asset class meant a regulated water utility, a toll road with an availability payment, or a contracted power station. Those promises are long duration cash flows with contractual or regulatory inflation linkage, low sensitivity to the economic cycle, modest growth, and a predictable yield. That description is still used in almost every client conversation. It describes a diminishing share of what the market is actually buying.
The clearest evidence is in strategy composition. Core infrastructure fundraising declined by nearly 19 percent over the most recent period, while core plus grew by approximately 390 percent and value added by about 30 percent. Most infrastructure capital raised is now in the core plus and value added categories, which is to say in strategies that acquire greenfield and brownfield projects, assets requiring turnarounds or stronger operating capability, and infrastructure adjacent services and technology businesses. Limited partners did not stumble into this. The surveys show them explicitly willing to move up the risk curve in pursuit of higher return, and the managers have built products to meet that demand. The point is not that the strategies are unsound. It is that a portfolio of greenfield development assets and operating turnarounds does not behave like a portfolio of regulated utilities, and the diligence question of which one a given fund holds is now the first question rather than a detail.
Sector composition has narrowed at the same time. Energy and power were responsible for nearly half of 2025 infrastructure deal value, with digital and telecommunications capturing a further quarter. Together those two verticals absorbed roughly three quarters of private deal value while representing about 40 percent of the estimated 106 trillion dollars of global infrastructure need through 2040. Private capital has concentrated where the need is most immediate and most financeable, which is rational, and where public capital moves too slowly, which is also rational. The consequence is that the diversification an investor obtains from a broad infrastructure fund is narrower than the category name implies, and narrower than it was five years ago.
The two shifts compound each other, because the fastest growing part of the energy and power vertical is power built for compute. Deal theses increasingly span verticals deliberately: multiple large funds have been raised with mandates to invest in both data centres and the power infrastructure that serves them, on the reasoning that power access is the binding constraint on the digital asset. Estimates of the capital involved are large enough to reshape the asset class. Nearly 7 trillion dollars of data centre investment may be required through 2030, against a backdrop in which United States power demand is expected to grow by more than 3 percent a year after nearly fifteen years of growth below 1 percent, and in which the largest technology companies are projected to spend a combined 5.3 trillion dollars on capital investment between 2025 and 2030. An infrastructure fund raised in 2026 is, to a first approximation, a levered position in the durability of that capital expenditure programme, delivered through assets with twenty year lives and financed at a cost of debt above the levels of the 2009 to 2020 period.
None of this is concealed. It is disclosed in fund documentation, discussed at length in manager materials, and reported in the trade press. It is simply not what the word infrastructure means in the sentence an adviser uses when explaining the allocation to a client.
The Distributions Problem
The most consequential single data point for a wealth business is the one that receives the least attention. Five year distributions to paid in capital in infrastructure peaked at a median of roughly 40 percent during the exit cycle of the mid 2010s. They have since declined to approximately 13 percent, the lowest recorded level. Average holding periods, measured as the age of investments made and not yet exited, have lengthened from a range of 3.1 to 3.3 years in the 2017 to 2022 window to a range of 3.5 to 3.8 years in 2023 and 2024. Distributions to paid in capital is now tied with multiple of invested capital as the second most important metric shaping limited partner allocation decisions, behind internal rate of return, which is a direct reflection of how pressing the realisation question has become.
Infrastructure’s distribution profile is less volatile than private equity’s, and the decline is not evidence of impairment. It is the arithmetic consequence of a market in which deployment accelerated sharply, holding periods lengthened, exit conditions became more selective, and entry multiples and financing costs both rose. Dry powder has fallen to about 23 percent of assets under management by the middle of 2025, roughly half the levels that prevailed for much of the 2009 to 2017 period, which is a sign of healthy deployment rather than distress. A maturing asset class that is deploying well and exiting slowly will show exactly this pattern.
The pattern nonetheless carries a specific and underexamined implication. Infrastructure is sold into the wealth channel substantially on the basis that it produces cash. A client who is told that an allocation offers contracted, inflation linked income, and who is then placed in a vehicle whose underlying asset class is currently distributing at the lowest rate on record, has been given a description that is true of the assets in the abstract and not true of the portfolio in practice. The gap between the two is not permanent and may close as the exit cycle turns. But it is the condition of the market at the moment the allocation is being made, and any discussion of expected cash yield that does not begin there is incomplete.
The Wrapper Arrives Before the Cash Does
The wealth channel will not access infrastructure through drawdown funds, for the same reasons it does not access private equity that way: minimums, capital call administration across jurisdictions and currencies, and a pacing discipline that private clients cannot sustain. It will access infrastructure through evergreen and semi-liquid structures, and that shift is already well advanced. Infrastructure managers are pursuing private wealth capital with the same urgency as their private equity and credit counterparts, and open ended and evergreen infrastructure products are now being offered through consultants and outsourced chief investment officer platforms as well as through distribution.
The regulatory architecture has moved to accommodate this. In the United Kingdom, long term asset funds have been permitted inside stocks and shares individual savings accounts since April of this year, extending to retail investors a vehicle originally designed for defined contribution schemes. In the European Union, the revision of the long term investment fund framework in January 2024 lowered minimum investment thresholds, eased diversification requirements and expanded cross border distribution rights, which converted a largely unused regime into a viable retail product and prompted a wave of infrastructure focused launches. Nearly half of European wealth investors are reported to be considering an allocation to that structure within three years.
Set the wrapper against Section III and the tension becomes visible. A semi-liquid vehicle meets redemptions from three sources: a liquid reserve, portfolio income and natural exits, or borrowing. Infrastructure is the asset class where the second of those has historically been most reliable, which is part of why the format has been extended to it. It is also the asset class whose realisation rate is currently at its lowest recorded level, whose holding periods are lengthening, and whose new deployment is weighted toward development assets that generate no income for years. A structure that promises periodic liquidity backed by contracted cash flow, holding a portfolio increasingly composed of assets that do not yet produce contracted cash flow, has a design assumption worth examining directly rather than assuming.
The industry’s own answer to the realisation shortfall is the secondaries market, and its growth has been rapid. More than 7 billion pounds was deployed into infrastructure secondaries in 2025, of which roughly 4 billion was in transactions initiated by limited partners, and infrastructure focused secondaries funds rose from 9 percent of the secondaries market in 2024 to 20 percent in 2025. Continuation vehicles have become a standard tool rather than a last resort, allowing a sponsor to retain a performing asset beyond the life of the original fund while offering an exit to investors who want one. Pricing has been firm, with nearly three quarters of infrastructure transactions initiated by general partners priced above 90 percent of net asset value, and target returns on those transactions averaging around 1.9 times invested capital and an internal rate of return near 18.7 percent.
This is a genuine and useful development, and it is also where the argument of this series in recent weeks becomes directly relevant. A continuation vehicle requires a sponsor to owe simultaneous fiduciary duties to two groups of investors whose interests diverge, those rolling and those exiting, and the price at which they are separated is set with reference to a valuation the sponsor produces. Independent third party valuation, a functioning advisory committee process and full disclosure are the recognised controls, and practice remains uneven across sponsors and jurisdictions with no settled standard. When the same asset is held inside an evergreen vehicle whose subscription and redemption price is that valuation, and when a meaningful share of the liquidity available to that vehicle comes from secondary transactions priced against it, the valuation policy is not a compliance appendix. It is the mechanism by which liquidity is produced.
The Diversifier and Its Counterparty
The strongest argument for infrastructure in a client portfolio has never been its return. It is that the return arrives from a different place than the rest of the portfolio’s return, through regulated tariffs, availability payments and long term contracts that are indexed to inflation and largely indifferent to the economic cycle. That argument is why 68 percent of limited partners still cite diversification as their leading motivation, and why the allocation appeals to a corridor whose portfolios are 89 percent traditional assets.
Sections II and III put a condition on the argument that is rarely stated. If roughly half of new deal value is energy and power, a quarter is digital and telecommunications, a growing share of the power is being built expressly to serve digital demand, and the marginal strategy is value added rather than core, then the diversification an investor obtains depends heavily on whether the specific fund holds regulated assets with contracted revenue or development assets with merchant exposure to a single demand thesis. Those two portfolios can sit under the same category heading, in the same allocation line, at the same fee, and behave in materially different ways during a period when expectations for compute demand are revised.
There is an irony in the survey data worth sitting with. Marsh’s respondents name technology, automation and broader disruption as the most significant structural force over a five to ten year horizon, cited by 83 percent, and cite artificial intelligence and technology disruption among their largest near term concerns at 73 percent. The same respondents are increasing their allocation to the asset class whose recent deployment is most concentrated in serving that technology’s physical requirements. There is no contradiction if the exposure is understood as what it is, since owning the infrastructure of a disruption is a defensible way to participate in it. There is a contradiction if the same position is simultaneously counted as the portfolio’s defensive, uncorrelated sleeve.
The practical consequence is that the useful unit of analysis has moved below the asset class. The relevant questions are what proportion of a fund’s revenue is regulated or contracted rather than merchant, what the weighted average remaining contract life is, what share of the portfolio is operating against greenfield or under construction, and how much of the revenue base depends on a single sector of counterparties. Those are answerable questions. They are simply not the questions an asset class allocation decision is normally designed to ask.
The Corridor Owns the Wrong Infrastructure
For the offshore and Latin American channel the picture inverts in a way that deserves stating plainly. The region has among the largest unmet infrastructure needs in the hemisphere and is receiving a small and shrinking share of the private capital raised to meet such needs. The Inter-American Development Bank puts the regional investment gap at roughly 2.5 percent of gross domestic product, on the order of 150 billion dollars a year, with the region investing approximately 3 percent of output against a recommended range of 4 to 8 percent. Electricity losses in transmission and distribution have averaged around 17 percent over three decades, roughly three times the rate of developed markets, and investment in transmission and distribution fell by about 40 percent between 2015 and 2021. The need is not theoretical and it is not primarily a question of appetite.
The activity data show the bottleneck clearly. Latin America and the Caribbean recorded 370 infrastructure transactions reaching financial close in 2025 for a total of 88.1 billion dollars, the lowest deal count since 2018, against 414 transactions worth 113.5 billion dollars in 2024 and a 2021 peak of 500. Brazil accounted for 214 of those transactions and 46 billion dollars of the total. Mexico recorded approximately 27 transactions worth 5.8 billion dollars. Practitioners interviewed at the close of the year described investor appetite as enormous and the constraint as the supply of well structured, bankable projects, with Brazil the only market judged to have a genuinely deep pipeline. Chile recorded eleven merger and acquisition transactions in the sector against a 2021 figure of thirty one. The regional calendar compounds the difficulty, with Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Haiti and Peru all holding major elections during 2026 and infrastructure regulation among the variables in play.
Where regional exposure is being packaged, it is being packaged for institutions rather than for private clients, and it is being packaged as a return seeking strategy rather than a defensive one. Dedicated emerging markets infrastructure funds have grown from vehicles targeting hundreds of millions of dollars to vehicles targeting 3 to 5 billion, with several large managers reaching or approaching final closes this year, one of them at three times the size of its predecessor. Average target returns across the emerging markets infrastructure cohort sit around 14 percent, with at least one manager explicitly targeting 300 to 400 basis points above its developed market flagship, and the premium is described by its sponsors as compensation for market specific risk and for historically thin institutional appetite. That appetite remains thin: a survey of forty global limited partners this year found just 4 percent focused on emerging markets against 42 percent on Europe and 27 percent on North America, and a material share of the largest emerging markets vehicles have closed below target. The estimated capital required to close the infrastructure gap across emerging markets through 2050 is in the region of 43 trillion dollars.
The consequence for a private client in Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Bogota or Miami is specific. A global infrastructure allocation purchased through a semi-liquid vehicle will hold, in the main, North American and European power generation, grid assets and data centres. The inflation linkage embedded in those assets is linkage to the inflation of the jurisdictions in which they operate, not to the inflation the client experiences. The currency exposure is the currency of the asset, not of the client’s liabilities. A Brazilian family whose spending is in reais and whose reporting is in dollars, holding an infrastructure fund whose revenues are indexed to United States and European price indices, owns a real asset. It does not own a hedge against its own cost of living, and describing it as one is the kind of imprecision that survives right up until it is tested.
The instruments that would give the corridor’s clients exposure to their own region’s infrastructure exist and mostly do not travel. Brazil’s incentivised and infrastructure debentures, with their income tax treatment for individual holders, are among the most developed instruments of their kind in any emerging market and sit largely outside the reach of an offshore booked portfolio. Mexican development capital certificates and energy and infrastructure trusts have the same character. The obstacle in each case is not the underlying credit but the wrapper: an exposure that cannot be custodied, identified and reported alongside the rest of a client’s assets across several booking centres and several jurisdictions will not enter an offshore portfolio regardless of its merits. Note based formats, including private notes and exchange traded note structures that bring private and local market exposures into an identifiable, custody eligible form, exist precisely to address that constraint, and the judgement of when a fund interest, a feeder or a note is the appropriate delivery mechanism for a given client in a given jurisdiction remains one of the scarcer technical capabilities in the corridor. The broader point stands on its own: the region’s clients are being offered the world’s infrastructure and not their own, and the reason is administrative rather than economic.
The Questions That Underwrite the Allocation
The argument of this paper converts into a diligence standard that any firm can apply this quarter. On composition, establish what proportion of the fund’s portfolio sits in core, core plus and value added, what share of assets is operating against under construction or greenfield, and what the weighted average remaining life of contracted or regulated revenue is. On concentration, establish the share of the portfolio exposed to power and digital infrastructure, and within that, the share whose demand case rests on data centre and compute growth, because a fund can be diversified by asset and concentrated by thesis. On revenue quality, establish what proportion of revenue is regulated, contracted or merchant, and what the repricing mechanism is in each case, since inflation linkage that depends on a regulatory review in five years is a different instrument from a contractual index applied annually.
On cash, establish the vehicle’s own distribution history against the asset class median rather than against its internal projection, establish what proportion of reported return is unrealised appreciation, and ask directly what the manager expects the yield to be over the next three years given the current composition of the portfolio. On liquidity, for any evergreen or semi-liquid vehicle, establish the target and actual size of the liquid sleeve, the extent to which the redemption model relies on portfolio income and on secondary sales, and the conditions under which redemptions may be limited or suspended. On valuation and conflicts, establish who marks the portfolio, whether external valuation agents are engaged for material positions, and what governance applies where the manager transacts with itself through a continuation vehicle, since that is now a routine event rather than an exceptional one. On price, obtain an itemised fee schedule by share class including acquired fund fees, interest expense and any charges associated with redemption.
On the corridor specifically, establish what geographic exposure the client is actually acquiring, in what currencies the underlying revenues are denominated, and to which jurisdictions’ price indices the inflation linkage refers, then state that answer to the client in the same sentence as the words inflation protection. Where regional exposure is the objective rather than global exposure, establish whether an administrable route to it exists for that client’s booking arrangement before the conversation about merit begins, because a compelling asset that cannot be held is not an allocation.
None of this argues against the allocation. The case for infrastructure in portfolios that are 89 percent traditional assets is strong, the capital requirement it serves is real and measurable, and the corridor’s clients are underexposed to it by any reasonable standard. The argument is narrower and, in a sense, familiar. Private markets categories are marketing categories before they are risk categories, and the gap between the two widens fastest in the years when a category is growing fastest. Infrastructure is in such a year. The allocation will be made across the wealth channel over the next several quarters, largely through semi-liquid vehicles, largely on the strength of a description of the asset class that was accurate a decade ago. Whether it turns out to be the defensive, inflation linked, income producing position that clients were told they were buying depends almost entirely on which fund, and on questions that can be asked before the money moves rather than discovered after.
Sources
- McKinsey & Company. Adrian Kwok, Alastair Green and Connor Mangan, «Infrastructure: Investing to Support Global Growth,» Global Private Markets Report 2026 (limited partner allocation intentions, fundraising records, strategy and sector composition, dry powder, holding periods and distributions to paid in capital). March 23, 2026. https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/private-capital/our-insights/global-private-markets-report/infrastructure
- Marsh. «2026 Global Asset Owner Barometer» (survey of 430 asset owners managing 5.76 trillion dollars across 25 countries, fielded June to July 2026; allocation intentions, private markets participation and structural risk views). September 21, 2026. https://www.mercer.com/insights/investments/market-outlook-and-trends/global-asset-owner-barometer
- Preqin. «Infrastructure in 2026» and Infrastructure Q1 2026 Quarterly Update (assets under management, dry powder, manager concentration and quarterly fundraising). 2026. https://www.preqin.com/insights/global-reports/infrastructure-in-2026
- Freshfields. Nick Kagan, Mary Lavelle and Sophie Lacaille, «Inside Infrastructure: Infrastructure Fundraising, New Channels, New Pathways to Navigate» (evergreen and semi-liquid structures, long term asset fund and European long term investment fund regimes, infrastructure secondaries and continuation vehicle governance). July 2, 2026. https://www.freshfields.com/en/our-thinking/blogs/transactions/inside-infrastructure-infrastructure-fundraising-new-channels-new-pathways-to-102n7t8
- Lazard. «2025 Secondary Market Report» (infrastructure secondaries pricing relative to net asset value and target returns on transactions initiated by general partners). 2026. https://www.lazard.com/research-insights/lazard-2025-secondary-market-report/
- ION Analytics, Infralogic. Eva Llorens, «Latin America’s Infrastructure Faces a Year of Contrasts» (regional transaction counts and values for 2025, country level detail for Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Peru and Colombia, and the 2026 electoral calendar). December 22, 2025. https://ionanalytics.com/insights/infralogic/latin-americas-infrastructure-faces-a-year-of-contrasts/
- ION Analytics, Infralogic. Brendan Malkin and Alexander Macleod, «The Growing Appeal of Emerging Markets Infra Funds» (emerging markets infrastructure fund sizes, target returns, limited partner focus data and close rates against target). September 4, 2026. https://ionanalytics.com/insights/infralogic/the-growing-appeal-of-emerging-markets-infra-funds/
- Goldman Sachs. «Private Markets Are Expected to Have a Growing Role in Data Center Financing» (projected technology sector capital expenditure, 2025 to 2030). 2026. https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/private-markets-expected-to-have-growing-role-in-data-center-financing
- Inter-American Development Bank. «Power Lost: Sizing Electricity Losses in Transmission and Distribution Systems in Latin America and the Caribbean.» https://publications.iadb.org/en/power-lost-sizing-electricity-losses-transmission-and-distribution-systems-latin-america-and
- Inter-American Development Bank. «The Infrastructure Gap in Latin America and the Caribbean: Investment Needed Through 2030 to Meet the Sustainable Development Goals» (regional investment gap as a share of gross domestic product). https://publications.iadb.org/en/infrastructure-gap-latin-america-and-caribbean-investment-needed-through-2030-meet-sustainable
- CBRE Investment Management. «Infrastructure Quarterly: Q1 2026» (fundraising trajectory, secondaries market share and demand drivers). 2026. https://www.cbreim.com/insights/articles/infrastructure-quarterly-q1-2026
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